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Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing Policies  
in the Electricity Sector 
Dallas Burtraw, Margaret Walls, and Joshua Blonz 
Abstract 
The introduction of a price on carbon dioxide will have important effects on the U.S. economy, 
and especially important effects on the electricity sector, which currently accounts for about 40 percent of 
carbon dioxide emissions. This paper examines alternative approaches to the distribution of allowance 
value to the sector, including free allocation to consumers through electricity and natural gas local 
distribution companies (LDCs). Recent proposals in the U.S. Congress, including H.R. 2454, have 
suggested this option as a way to address impacts on consumers and potential regional inequities. We 
compare allocation to electricity LDCs with a system in which allowances are auctioned and revenues 
returned to households as a per capita dividend. We evaluate the outcomes under alternative assumptions 
about how LDCs, which are regulated entities, pass through the allowance value to final residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers. Our results show that the LDC approach raises the price of 
allowances and imposes greater costs on households than the per capita dividend option. We also evaluate 
a more complete characterization of H.R. 2454 and show that an incremental reform to that bill would 
greatly reduce costs and have more balanced impacts across households in different income groups and 
regions. 
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Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing Policies 
in the Electricity Sector 
Dallas Burtraw, Margaret Walls, and Joshua Blonz∗ 
I. Introduction 
It is well-recognized that a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program will have its greatest 
impacts on the electricity sector, which currently accounts for 40 percent of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions in the United States. The sector is also a focus of concerns over the costs that 
climate policy will impose on households. An average household spends approximately $1,315 
per year on electricity, which is 31.2 percent of total direct energy expenditures (for electricity, 
gasoline, natural gas, and heating oil) and 2.25 percent of average household income. In some 
regions of the country, these numbers are even higher, and for lower-income households the 
expenditures make up a considerably larger fraction of the annual income (estimates updated 
from Burtraw et al. [2009]).  
These factors have led researchers, advocates, and policymakers to suggest a variety of 
approaches to reducing the impacts of climate policy on consumers and alleviating regional 
disparities. These approaches include assorted ways of redistributing the revenue from auctioned 
allowances under a cap-and-trade system (or revenue from a carbon tax) and alternative means of 
allocating allowances under cap and trade. Most recently, H.R. 2454, the Waxman–Markey bill, 
has proposed that allocation of some portion of allowances under a cap-and-trade system go to 
electricity and natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs) based on current patterns of 
consumption and emissions. LDCs are retail providers that distribute energy to homes and 
businesses and are responsible for billing consumers for all the costs of delivered energy. For 
electricity, these costs include the costs associated with generation, transmission, and 
distribution, and for natural gas, they include well-head costs, transportation, and distribution. 
Because they are regulated entities, the thinking is that LDCs will act as trustees on behalf of 
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consumers and will use the allowance value to lessen the burden of climate policy. Under H.R. 
2454, electricity LDCs would receive about 30 percent and natural gas LDCs 9 percent of the 
value of emissions allowances over the next decade. The allocation would phase out between 
2026 and 2030. 
If LDCs indeed act as trustees on behalf of consumers, then we can expect the electricity 
and natural gas bills that customers see under this approach to be lower than they would be in a 
full auction of allowances. The question, then, is how exactly the bills are affected. If the 
variable price of electricity is lower, then electricity consumption will be higher than in a full 
auction, and other energy sectors such as transportation and industry will have to pick up the 
slack.1 The price of CO2 in this case will be higher than in the full-auction scenario. This leads to 
higher prices for all goods and services, making it unclear whether households in any given 
region or income group are actually made better off or worse off as a result of the decision to 
subsidize electricity consumption through allocation to LDCs.  
It is possible, though, that electricity LDCs will pass on the value to customers through a 
fixed charge component rather than the variable electricity price. This would preserve the 
marginal price signal, providing a stronger incentive to reduce electricity consumption, while in 
principle providing lump sum relief through lower electricity bills. Electricity bills have a fixed-
cost component that covers the cost of providing service to a customer and a variable-cost 
component that covers the cost of acquiring electricity from the wholesale market, but the extent 
to which monthly bills actually separate fixed from variable charges varies around the country. 
In most jurisdictions, in fact, very little of the fixed cost is actually placed in a fixed charge; in 
cases in which fixed and variable charges are separated, the fixed charges are typically recovered 
on a volumetric basis. Bill reform would be necessary to provide billing that recovered fixed 
costs in a separate accounting from variable costs, but this is the domain of state public utility 
commissions. Moreover, even if fixed and variable charges were separated, it is a behavioral 
issue whether households and businesses would distinguish changes in the overall bill from 
changes in the marginal price.  
These issues highlight the uncertainties that exist with the LDC approach to allocation. In 
this paper, we analyze the effect of LDC allocation on households across a variety of scenarios 
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and behavioral assumptions. We assess the distributional impacts across 11 regions of the 
country and 10 income groups. We first look only at the 30 percent of the allowance value that is 
to be allocated to electricity LDCs under H.R. 2454, and we compare three alternative scenarios. 
In one case, we assume conventional electricity pricing and behavior for all customer classes. All 
consumers—residential, commercial, and industrial—receive the allocation of allowance value 
to LDCs as a reduction in the variable price of electricity over the full-auction scenario. In a 
second case, we assume that LDCs are able to entirely separate the fixed and variable charges for 
industrial and commercial customers and that these consumers respond rationally; residential 
customers, meanwhile, are assumed to perceive the reduction in the fixed charge (and 
commensurately in their overall bill) as a reduction in the variable price of electricity. We 
compare theses two cases to a third in which there is no free allocation to LDCs at all, but rather 
the value is returned to households as a per capita, nontaxable dividend.  
We investigate whether the LDC approach does a better job of protecting low- and 
middle-income households and/or reduces regional disparities. We also analyze if the benefits 
from lower electricity prices are offset by the higher allowance price and impacts in other 
sectors. The results shed light on a familiar trade-off between distributional and efficiency goals 
in policy design and allow us to describe the efficiency cost of this attempt to address 
distributional concerns.  
Finally, we focus more narrowly on the specific design in the proposed legislation H.R. 
2454. In addition to the allocation to electric LDCs, we incorporate the 9 percent allocated to 
natural gas LDCs, the 1.5 percent to home heating-oil providers, and the 15 percent that goes to 
low-income households. Together, these features of the bill account for an additional 26 percent 
of emissions allowances to bring the total to 56 percent. We compare this approach to full 
auction and per capita dividend, and to a more incremental reform for H.R. 2454 that preserves 
allocation to LDCs for residential-class customers only.  
Our analysis suggests that households on net are made worse off as a consequence of the 
LDC allocation policy compared to one in which the revenue is distributed directly back to 
households on a per capita basis. Assuming that commercial and industrial customers respond 
rationally to the fixed/variable distinction reduces the burden somewhat, but even in that case, 
the LDC approach is more costly to households than an auction-and-dividend option. We also 
note some interesting regional differences in results between the LDC allocation scheme 
compared with auction and dividend. Finally, we find that an incremental reform—allocating 
some allowances to LDCs based on residential consumption and the remainder as a per capita 
dividend—does a better job of achieving the distributional and regional goals of H.R. 2454 than Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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does the approach in the bill, which allocates more to electricity and natural gas LDCs, home 
heating-oil providers, and low-income households. Moreover, our reform does so at a lower 
efficiency cost. 
We hasten to point out that our analysis focuses on household consumption behavior and 
the impacts of carbon pricing that are felt through higher prices and expenditures, as well as the 
impacts of the allocation schemes.  In fact, the latter is our focus here.  However, we do not 
assess any general equilibrium effects, impacts on specific industries, and impacts felt through 
worker dislocations.  We also do not consider the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions and the 
distribution of those benefits across income groups and regions.  Furthermore, we focus on 
annual income as a measure of ability to pay, rather than a measure of lifetime income.2  In our 
earlier work, we used a measure of lifetime income (Burtraw et al. 2009). 
In the next section, we briefly discuss other literature that has assessed the distributional 
impacts of climate policy. Following that discussion, we review the evolution in policy with 
respect to allocation of emissions allowances and provide the rationale behind the LDC approach 
given the current landscape of electricity regulation in the United States. Section IV describes 
our data and methodology, including the Haiku electricity market model used to assess impacts 
of carbon pricing in the electricity sector. Section V presents results with respect to general 
approaches to allocation. In Section VI we consider in more detail the Waxman–Markey 
proposal (H.R. 2454) as a case study in current policy. Section VII provides concluding remarks. 
II. Literature Review 
It is now fairly well-established that putting a price on CO2 emissions disproportionately 
harms low-income households. Pricing CO2 increases energy prices; while higher-income 
households tend to spend more on energy than do low-income households, they spend less as a 
fraction of income. Thus, low-income households tend to be harmed relatively more when 
energy prices rise. Even accounting for the indirect effect on nonenergy goods and services, this 
finding tends to hold (Hassett et al. 2009). Agreement on this point has contributed to a focus in 
recent years on the allocation of allowance value in a cap-and-trade program or distribution of 
revenues raised with a carbon tax or auctioned allowances. Findings in the literature now 
emphasize the importance of allocation to the overall efficiency and equity of the program.  
                                                 
2 See Fullerton (2009) for a discussion of the various distributional aspects of taxes. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
5 
Dinan and Rogers (2002) find that distributional effects hinge crucially on whether 
allowances are grandfathered or auctioned and whether revenues from allowance auctions, or 
from indirect taxation of allowance rents, are used to cut payroll or corporate taxes or provide 
lump sum transfers to households. For example, they estimate that households in the lowest-
income quintile would see their average after-tax income reduced by 6 percent under 
grandfathered allowances, while households in the top quintile would see a gain of 1.2 percent. 
Grandfathering tends to benefit high-income households because the value accrues to 
shareholders, who are primarily in the upper-income groups. This result was also found in Parry 
(2004) in a calibrated analytical model. In contrast, Dinan and Rogers (2002) find that if 
allowances are auctioned with revenues returned in equal lump sum rebates for all households, 
then the distribution of costs across income levels would be reversed. Households in the bottom 
quintile would see average after-tax income rise by 3.5 percent while households in the top 
quintile would lose 1.6 percent. Using auction revenues to cut payroll or corporate taxes is found 
to be regressive, though less so than grandfathering. 
Metcalf et al. (2008) assess the overall impacts of three recent CO2 tax bills introduced in 
Congress, assuming that revenues are returned as per capita dividends. They focus on the 
question of whether the tax is passed forward to consumers or borne in part by producers. 
Specifically, they look at three scenarios: one in which the burden of the tax is fully passed 
forward to consumers in the form of higher energy and product prices and two scenarios in 
which a share of the burden is borne by producers, that is, shareholders of firms.
3 The tax alone, 
assuming full forward shifting, is highly regressive, but returning revenues lump sum makes it 
progressive; households in deciles 1 through 6 are actually better off with the policy, while only 
the two highest-income deciles experience a net loss. Shifting the burden back to shareholders 
also reduces the regressivity of the tax, as shareholders are predominantly in the higher-income 
groups. 
Metcalf (2009) assesses the impact of a CO2 tax coupled with a reduction in payroll 
taxes. Specifically, he gives each worker in a household a tax credit equal to the first $560 of 
payroll taxes; this would be equivalent to exempting from the payroll tax the first $3,660 of 
wages per worker. Metcalf (2009) finds that this option leads to an outcome that is 
approximately distributionally neutral. He then analyzes an option that couples this rebate with 
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an adjustment to Social Security payments that benefits the lowest-income households. This 
makes the CO2 policy more progressive. Finally, he compares these options to a lump sum 
redistribution of the CO2 tax revenues and finds that this last option is the most progressive of 
all. 
Studies that also analyze the regional impacts of climate policy include Hassett et al. 
(2009), Boyce and Riddle (2009), and Burtraw et al. (2009).4 Hassett et al. (2009) use data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) for 1987, 1997, and 2003 
and assess the impacts of a carbon tax if it were enacted in each of those years. They find that the 
direct component of the tax—the impact felt through direct energy consumption—is significantly 
more regressive than the indirect component—the impact felt through consumption of energy-
using goods and services. They also find, as have several other studies, that the regressivity of 
the tax is muted when a measure of lifetime income is used rather than annual income. The 
authors find only small differences in the incidence of the tax across regions. However, they only 
look at impacts on average households in each region and not across income groups. 
Boyce and Riddle (2009) assess the state-by-state net impact on households of a cap-and-
dividend option in which the government auctions all CO2 emissions allowances and returns the 
revenue as a per capita dividend. The authors estimate state-level impacts by adjusting national-
level CES data on the basis of state-level income, an estimate of emissions intensity of electricity 
consumption in each state, and information on regional consumption patterns from Burtraw et al. 
(2009). The authors conclude that differences across states are relatively small compared to 
differences across income brackets. They find that within each state, for a program with a $25 
per metric ton CO2 (mtCO2) allowance price, at least 60 percent of households receive net 
benefits, that is, the per capita dividends more than offset the impact of carbon pricing on 
expenditures.  
Burtraw et al. (2009) assess the incidence of a cap-and-trade proposal similar to the 
Lieberman–Warner proposal (S. 2191), which results in a $20.91/mtCO2 allowance price, with 
five alternatives for distributing the allowance value: two cap-and-dividend scenarios, one in 
which dividends are taxed and one untaxed, and three options that would change preexisting 
taxes: reducing the payroll tax, reducing the personal income tax, and expanding the Earned 
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Income Tax Credit (EITC). The authors find that the cap-and-dividend options and the EITC 
alternative reverse the regressivity of carbon pricing. Reducing payroll or income taxes, 
however, exacerbates the regressivity. Regional differences are small for average households for 
all of the options but are significantly larger for lower-income households.  
The recent debate and passage of H.R. 2454 have resulted in analyses from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA; 2009), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO; 2009), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA; 2009). These analyses differ from the aforementioned 
journal articles in that they narrowly analyze only the provisions detailed in the legislation. The 
EIA, CBO, and EPA all used different models and different underlying assumptions in those 
models. The studies yield average costs of $134 (EIA), $175 (CBO), and $105 (EPA) per 
household in 2020. These cost estimates are for the national average household in the United 
States, with only CBO providing a breakdown of effects across the income distribution. CBO 
finds that households in the lowest-income quintile would see a net benefit of $40, with 
households in the highest quintile experiencing a net cost of $245. 
III. Allocation in Cap-and-Trade Programs 
The economics literature finds significant efficiency advantages from distribution of 
emissions allowances through an auction rather than free allocation. Some benefits are 
qualitative: an auction is administratively simple, it helps to maintain transparency and the 
perception of fairness, and it leads to more efficient pricing of goods in the economy, which 
reduces the cost of the policy (Binmore and Klemperer 2002; Burtraw et al. 2007). In contrast, 
especially in regulated electricity markets, free allocation can move consumer prices away from 
the marginal social cost of production and therefore distort resource allocation in the wider 
economy away from the efficient optimum (Burtraw et al. 2002). 
Another forceful reason why economists favor the use of an auction (or an emissions tax) 
is that it generates funds that can be used to help reduce the cost of policy. One use of funds 
might be to invest in program-related goals such as energy efficiency (Ruth et al. 2008). The 
public finance literature has focused on dedicating the use of revenue from an auction to reduce 
preexisting taxes. Like any new regulation, climate policy imposes a cost on households and 
firms that acts like a virtual tax, reducing the real wages of workers. However, revenue from an 
auction, if dedicated to reducing other preexisting taxes, can reduce this cost. This so-called 
revenue recycling would have substantial efficiency advantages compared with free distribution 
(Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Parry et al. 1999).  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
8 
In practice, however, most previous emissions trading programs have distributed 
emissions allowances for free. The most well-known example may be the so-called 
grandfathering of allowances in the sulfur dioxide (SO2) trading program initiated under the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in the United States. This program freely allocates emissions 
allowances to incumbent emissions sources based on a formula that multiplies heat input during 
a base period (1985–1987) by a target emissions rate (measured in tons per million British 
thermal units heat input). The allocation does not adjust over time, which avoids creating 
incentives for investment behavior to deviate from what is otherwise efficient. However, that 
rule leads to the result that facilities that retire continue to receive their allocation decades into 
the future. 
Other trading programs that freely allocate allowances, such as the NOx budget program 
in the United States, typically have such adjustments. Individual states determine the allocation 
of NOx allowances and most have set-asides for new sources, while sources that retire lose their 
allocations. Adjustments in the allocation to new sources or to remove allowances from retired 
sources also have been common in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (Åhman et 
al. 2007). The downside of this scheme is that it can bias investment toward higher-emitting 
generating sources because of the value of the subsidy received (Åhman and Holmgren 2006). 
Furthermore, the removal of allocations from sources that retire provides a financial incentive to 
continue the operation of existing facilities that otherwise would retire. 
The suggestion of free distribution through grandfathering to incumbent emitters without 
adjustment should be the most popular approach for industry because it awards an asset worth 
tens of billions of dollars. In the electricity sector, which is the focus of our study, such an 
approach would lead to substantial net profits (windfall profits) as a result of climate policy 
(Burtraw and Palmer 2008). This occurs because the increase in revenues associated with the 
increase in electricity price would greatly outweigh the increase in costs resulting from 
compliance with the program when emissions allowances are given away for free. Experience in 
the E.U. system also indicates that the net profits that resulted from free allocation to the 
electricity sector emerged as one of the most politically controversial aspects of the program. 
Nonetheless, the suggestion of free distribution through grandfathering to incumbent 
emitters poses a dilemma that has divided opinions within the electricity industry in the United 
States. The industry is split into two camps along geographic lines that correspond to regulatory 
status. Before the 1992 Energy Policy Act, the industry was fully regulated for all services 
including generation, transmission, and distribution, and typically these services were delivered 
by a single vertically integrated firm in each service territory. Under regulation, electricity prices Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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are set to recover total costs, and although exceptions abound, the rule of thumb is that prices are 
set at the average cost of service. That is, total costs divided by total sales should equal the 
average electricity price.  
Since the mid-1990s, roughly half the nation has moved away from cost-of-service 
regulation to the use of market-based prices for generation services. In these regions—the 
northeast states, Texas, and to varying degrees parts of the Ohio Valley—generation costs are 
determined by the marginal cost of providing power in the wholesale power market. The 
marginal cost can vary significantly over the time of day and season of the year as different 
generation units are brought into service that have different fuel costs and different emissions 
rates for CO2.  
The way prices are determined varies greatly under these two market structures, and 
consequently the effect of grandfathered allowances on electricity prices varies as well. In a 
competitive market firms are expected to recognize the opportunity cost of using an allowance 
for compliance even if they received the allowance for free, and that opportunity cost should be 
reflected in the marginal cost of providing electricity. Hence, in market-based regions, the price 
of power should increase to reflect not only the resource costs of reducing emissions, but also the 
value of allowances that are used for compliance, even if those allowances were received for 
free. 
A different outcome results in regulated regions, where allowances are added to total 
recoverable costs at their original cost of zero under grandfathering. Hence, in these regions the 
cost of service would increase by the cost of achieving emissions reductions through fuel 
switching, using more efficient facilities, and so forth, but the cost would not include emissions 
allowances. The value of allowances is several times greater than the resource costs associated 
with reducing emissions, so the exclusion of that value in electricity prices means that prices 
would increase by much less than if the firm had to acquire their allowances in an auction.  
As a consequence of the differences in regulation and market structure in different states, 
the effect on retail electricity prices of climate policy using grandfathering varies across regions. 
In fact, the difference in the change in prices depends much more on the regulation that is in 
place than on the actual emissions intensity of electricity. Paul et al. (2009a) estimate the effect 
on prices from the introduction of an emissions cap in the electricity sector commensurate with 
the Lieberman–Warner proposal as modeled by the EIA (2008). They find an auction would 
cause electricity prices to increase by $7/MWh in 2020 on average (2004$), with regulated 
regions experiencing an increase of $6.10 and market-based regions experiencing an increase of Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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$8.50. However, under grandfathering the change in prices on average for the nation would be 
just $2.70. Prices would actually fall by $1 in regulated regions compared to the absence of 
climate policy, while they would rise by $9.90 in market-based regions.  
The difference in the potential price increases of grandfathering has fueled a dissonance 
in the industry, with widely divided views about the merits of climate policy. Over the last 
couple of years an alternative proposal has emerged that provided a way out of this dilemma for 
the industry: free allocation to electricity consumers rather than to electricity generators. The 
proposal also appeals to consumer advocates, and won the endorsement of the National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (April 21, 2008). Free allocation to consumers 
could be achieved by allocating not to generation companies, which are the historic emitters, but 
to the LDCs that deliver retail power to households and businesses. These companies are 
regulated throughout the nation and charge electricity prices that are a combination of expenses 
incurred from purchasing generation and transmissions services and their own costs of 
distribution. Since these companies are regulated, they might be expected to act as trustees on 
behalf of customers and to pass on, in some form, the value of emissions allowances they receive 
for free. This proposal has emerged as a key piece of proposed legislation, including the 
Waxman–Markey proposal (H.R. 2454). 
In effect, free allocation to LDCs looks like grandfathering for regulated regions of the 
country, because the value of CO2 allowances is not reflected in prices in these regions under 
grandfathering. Moreover, this effect is carried over to market-based regions under free 
allocation to LDCs. Paul et al. (2009a) indicate that free allocation on the basis of population 
served by the LDCs would lead to no increase in electricity prices in regulated regions and to an 
increase of just $1.80/MWh in competitive regions, with national average electricity prices 
increasing by just $0.60/MWh by 2020. This difference in the change in prices is broadly 
consistent with the emissions intensity of generation in these regions, and hence would seem to 
offer a consistent economic signal. 
A problem, however, is that the economic signal that is offered is weakened and does not 
provide adequate information about the opportunity cost of CO2 emissions to electricity 
consumers. The award of free allowances to LDCs constitutes a subsidy to electricity 
consumption, resulting in lower prices and greater levels of electricity use. Consequently, other 
covered sectors are required to make additional, less efficient, reductions. For the same Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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emissions, this raises the price of emissions allowances by roughly 15 percent (Paul et al. 
2009a).5 Ultimately LDC allocation provides both advantages and disadvantages that must be 
well understood and balanced if it is to be used. 
The second issue associated with allocation to LDCs is how to determine the 
apportionment among LDCs of the allowance value to be distributed. Paul et al. (2009a) consider 
three possible metrics with apportionment on the basis of population, emissions, or electricity 
consumption, and they find that this choice can change the price impact in various regions by 
over $10/MWh. For example, regions that have relatively high population and relatively low 
emissions, such as California or the Northeast, would benefit from allocation on the basis of 
population, while regions with relatively high emissions would prefer allocation on the basis of 
emissions. These large regional effects are an important determinant of a national compromise. 
 The third issue associated with allocation to LDCs is exactly how they can be expected 
to act on behalf of consumers. The estimates are built on the assumption that the award of 
allowance value would be used by the LDCs to reduce the electricity price, which leads to 
expanded consumption. However, the way that the value is used will be determined at the state 
level, where public utility commissions have the prerogative to determine electricity rates for 
cost recovery of the LDCs. Language inserted into the Waxman–Markey legislation, which we 
discuss below, would attempt to ensure that all customers are treated fairly, or to get around the 
expected increase in electricity consumption associated with lower prices by directing value to 
be applied to reducing the fixed costs rather than variable costs in some cases. Whether this is 
plausible, and how that might be implemented, is an open question that in practical terms appears 
beyond the reach of Congress. Consequently, the outcome of allocation to LDCs is uncertain, 
and we explore the possibilities in our simulation analysis. 
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fairness of the program, the overall efficiency of the cap-and-trade program is reduced to the extent that the price 
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IV. Data and Methodology 
We base our analysis on CES data from 2004 through 2006. The population sampled in 
the CES includes 97,519 observations for 39,839 households; an observation equals one 
household in one quarter. We use these observations to construct national after-tax income 
deciles, but since we are interested in regional analyses we examine the CES data with state-level 
indicators. This leaves us with a sample for examining regional effects that includes 82,033 
observations for 33,234 households in 43 states plus the District of Columbia. We aggregate the 
observations into 11 regions (the 21 regions in the Haiku model are mapped into these 11 
regions). Although observations with missing state identifiers are not used in our regional-level 
calculations, they are included in our calculations at the national level.  
We account for direct energy expenditures and indirect expenditures through the 
purchase of goods and services. 6 We focus the analysis on 2015, assuming that consumption 
patterns are the same as in our data period with two exceptions. One is personal transportation; 
we account for changes in the vehicle fleet expected to result by 2015 from the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act. In addition, we allow for technological and economic changes in 
electricity markets that are expected by 2015. Our electricity consumption patterns are obtained 
from Resources for the Future’s Haiku electricity model. The Haiku model solves for electricity 
market equilibria in 21 regions of the country, accounting for price-sensitive demand, electricity 
transmission between regions, system operation for three seasons of the year (spring and fall are 
combined) and four times of day, and changes in capacity investment and retirement over a 25-
year horizon (Paul et al. 2009b). The Haiku model also captures differences in the regulatory 
environment across regions and allows us to model different behavioral assumptions 
corresponding to fixed and variable charges for residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers, as we explained in the introduction. Table 1 reports the electricity sector results for 
the 11 regions of the country that we model, with an indication of how states are aggregated into 
these regions.7 National baseline emissions of 0.596 tons of CO2 emissions per megawatt-hour 
reflect model results for 2015 in the absence of any climate policy. After the introduction of an 
emissions cap leading to a price of $20.91/mtCO2 (2006$), the allowance price for 2015 
predicted by EIA (2008) to result under the Lieberman–Warner proposal, emissions fall to 0.492 
                                                 
6 Indirect consumption accounts for approximately 49 percent of an average household’s carbon emissions. 
7 The 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia are included in the electricity modeling, but as noted five 
states (Iowa, New Mexico, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) are dropped when calculating effects on 
households at the regional level. However, national estimates always include these five states. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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tons/MWh. Table 1 also reports the change in electricity price on a regional basis and the change 




Household direct energy expenditures include electricity, gasoline, natural gas, and 
heating oil. Figure 1 shows expenditures in each of these categories as a fraction of annual 
income for average households in each income decile. Spending on electricity does not vary 
substantially in absolute terms across deciles, but it does vary as a share of income, ranging from 
10.0 percent for the lowest decile to 1.2 percent for the highest. On average, across all deciles, 
households spend 2.25 percent of income directly on electricity. 
Regionally, we find some differences in spending as a fraction of income, but they are 
not large for average households. Results are shown in Figure 2. The average total expenditure 
ranges from a low of 6.4 percent of annual income in California to a high of 8.1 percent in Texas. 
Region States
Baseline CO2 













0.583 0.464 13% -5%
California CA 0.170 0.166 7% -2%
Texas TX 0.549 0.549 15% -5%
Florida FL 0.538 0.448 15% -4%
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, 
OH, WV, WI
0.794 0.654 27% -8%
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 0.573 0.512 18% -3%
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 0.372 0.317 12% -4%
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 0.344 0.195 8% -3%
New York NY 0.308 0.288 16% -1%
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 0.835 0.749 20% -9%
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 0.627 0.471 18% -7%
National 0.596 0.492 16% -5%
Table 1. Haiku Modeling Results for 2015 under a Baseline and with the Introduction of a 
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  The model also estimates household-level consumer surplus loss that results from a cap-
and-trade program. Initial consumer surplus loss (before any revenue is returned) is scaled to 
total the area under the marginal abatement cost curve at the given CO2 price as estimated by 
EIA in its Lieberman–Warner analysis for all sectors except electricity. The electricity sector 
marginal abatement cost curves are taken from Haiku and vary across scenarios. The initial 
consumer surplus loss is combined with estimates of the value of the allowances under the 
various distribution schemes to obtain our estimates of net consumer surplus loss. 
V. Allocating 30 Percent of Allowances to LDCs 
The primary set of scenarios is set up to isolate the effects of two potential LDC 
allocation outcomes and to compare the results to an auction case in which the allowance value is 
returned as per capita dividends. We analyze three approaches to distributing 30 percent of the 
total allowance value. In case 1, we assume conventional electricity pricing with the subsidy 
placed in the variable portion of the bill. It is equivalent for practical purposes to assume what 
we describe as conventional economic behavior. By this we mean that for all customer classes 
we assume that even if regulators try to preserve the CO2 price as a component of variable prices 
and assign the allowance value to reduce fixed costs, customers are unable to distinguish 
between a change in their bill and a change in their price. Under what we characterize as 
conventional behavior, all customers perceive the allocation of allowance value to LDCs as a 
reduction in the variable price of electricity from the full-auction case.  
In case 2, we assume that LDCs are able to entirely separate the fixed and variable 
charges and pass on the allowance value by lowering the fixed charge; variable electricity prices 
are assumed to rise, reflecting the CO2 price, as in the auction case. We assume further in case 2 
that industrial and commercial customers exhibit rational behavior, that is, they distinguish a 
change in their bill from a change in the price and do not change their electricity consumption in 
response to changes in fixed charges. They are assumed to pass on the value of the allowances to 
shareholders. Residential customers, on the other hand, continue to exhibit conventional behavior 
and do not perceive the fixed/variable difference, and respond as if electricity prices are lower 
(as in case 1). We compare these outcomes with a third scenario in which there is no free 
allocation to LDCs, and the same share of allowance value that would be given to LDCs is 
returned to households as a per capita, nontaxable dividend. We label this third case auction and 
dividend.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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Impacts on Costs and Incidence across Income Groups  
Table 2 shows the difference in net consumer surplus loss for cases 1 and 2 as compared 
with the auction-and-dividend scenario. The differences are shown for average households in 
each of ten income deciles as well as the national average across all households.
9 Keep in mind 
that these are the differences in net consumer surplus losses that result when 30 percent of the 
allowance value is distributed in alternative ways. Of the remaining 70 percent, we assume that 
14 percent is withheld by government to account for its own changes in direct energy costs at the 
federal, state, and local levels; the remaining 56 percent is not accounted for in our model (e.g., it 
may include free allocation to emitters or be used to fund other government expenditures). The 
allowance price that results in each case is also shown in Table 2. The full consumer surplus loss 
before any of the allowance value is returned to consumers averages $829 per household when 
the allowance price is $20.91/mtCO2.
10 This is the allowance price that obtains in the auction-
and-dividend scenario that we examine as well. Although we focus on just 30 percent of the 
allowance value that might be distributed in various ways, for a point of comparison we note that 
if all of the allowance value is returned to households as a per capita dividend (except for the 14 
percent retained by government), the net consumer surplus loss averages $130 per household.  
 
                                                 
9 National averages include five states not included in the regions. 
10 All results are reported in 2006 dollars. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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Case 1, in which all customer classes perceive a reduction in the price of electricity 
compared with the auction-and-dividend scenario, leads to the highest allowance price—
$26.90/mtCO2 as compared with $20.91/mtCO2 with the per capita dividend. The higher 
allowance price results because electricity prices are held down in this scenario. Electricity 
consumption and emissions are consequently higher, and to achieve the same aggregate 
emissions economywide, emissions reductions must be achieved in other sectors of the economy 
in which they are more costly. This leads, in turn, to higher costs for other goods and services 
and raises the net consumer surplus loss of the average household by $157 compared with the 
auction-and-dividend scenario. Thus, although electricity expenditures are held down, the 
benefits to households are more than offset by higher costs elsewhere in their consumption 
bundle. 
In case 2, in which only residential customers perceive a lower electricity price in 
comparison with the full-auction approach, industrial and commercial customers respond to their 
higher variable electricity price by reducing consumption and thus emissions. This leads to a 
smaller allowance price than in case 1 ($22.72/mtCO2), but still raises the net consumer surplus 











1 7,030 104 112
2 15,372 112 133
3 23,038 130 152
4 31,036 144 162
5 39,553 163 177
6 49,596 167 161
7 61,558 184 165
8 77,074 188 157
9 100,267 200 109
10 178,677 175 ‐673
Avg 58,321 157 66
Note: Deciles constructed at the national level.
* 30% of total permits are allocated to Cap and Dividend and LDCs respectively. The remaining revenue effectively disappears.
Table 2.  Comparison of Costs of Climate Policy Under Alternative Allocation Schemes* 
(2006 Dollars)Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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As the third column of Table 2 makes clear, the difference in burdens between case 1 and 
the auction-and-dividend scenario grows as we move up the income distribution. However, as a 
fraction of household income, the numbers become smaller. Our earlier research showed that the 
auction-and-dividend approach is quite progressive in that households in the lower-income 
deciles see a net gain from climate policy once revenues are returned in a lump sum, per capita 
payment (Burtraw et al. 2009).11 Moving to the LDC allocation approach dampens that 
progressivity by raising costs overall and redistributing some of the costs from higher-income to 
lower-income households. 
This distributional effect is especially evident when comparing across the two LDC 
allocation scenarios. In case 2, the scenario with separate fixed and variable pricing, commercial 
and industrial customers are assumed to take the subsidy on the fixed portion of their bill and pay 
it out as a dividend to their shareholders. The higher variable costs, however, are passed on to 
their customers in the form of more expensive goods and services. While this impacts all 
households, the majority of shareholders are in the top income decile.
12 On the national level, the 
top income decile fares $673 better than under the auction-and-dividend allocation scheme. This 
increase is at the expense of households in the lowest five deciles, who do not own much equity, 
but are still faced with higher prices for goods and services. The average household in each of 
the lowest five deciles is worse off under case 2 than case 1 even though the average household 
overall is better off.  
   
                                                 
11 It is important to note that the strong progressivity of cap and dividend in Burtraw et al. (2009) results from 86 
percent of the revenue being returned as a dividend.  
12 Several studies have emphasized this point; see the analysis of grandfathering of allowances in Dinan and Rogers 
(2002) and Parry (2004), for example. We use the Federal Reserve Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances to 
determine allocations to shareholders (http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/2004/scf2004home.html).  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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Regional Impacts  
A partial motivation for the LDC approach was to balance the impacts of climate policy 
across regions. As we explained in Section IV, differences in regulation across regions as well as 
differences in fuel mix are likely to create differences in costs for households. How the full 
effects play out once we account for consumption patterns across regions and the impact of the 
LDC approach on prices of all goods and services is unclear. Table 3 shows our findings by 
region. As in Table 2, we show the difference in net consumer surplus loss for case 1 and case 2 
over the auction-and-dividend approach for average households; Table 3 shows the results for 




There are substantial differences in the costs of the different approaches across regions. 
Average households in California and the Northwest are much worse off under the LDC 
approach, under either case 1 or 2 assumptions, than with a per capita dividend. The average 
household in California loses an additional $265 in consumer surplus in case 1 and the average 
household in the Northwest an additional $226. This compares to the average additional loss 









Southeast 56,528 148 75
California 69,317 265 135
Texas 58,586 170 56
Florida 54,325 124 52
Ohio Valley 60,237 97 1
Mid‐Atlantic 66,037 134 0
Northeast 69,702 185 52
Northwest 61,572 226 141
New York 66,930 168 25
Plains 63,131 145 58
Mountains 58,202 135 67
National 58,321 157 66
Table 3. Regional Comparison of Costs of Climate Policy Under Alternative Allocation 
Schemes*  (2006 Dollars)
* 30% of total permits are allocated to Cap and Dividend and LDCs respectively. The remaining revenue effectively disappears.
Note:  Deciles constructed at the national level.   Negative welfare losses reflect a net increase in welfare after CO2 revenues
 are redistributedResources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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experience a drop in fixed charges on their electricity bill and pass that on to shareholders, 
households in California and the Northwest are harmed relatively more. By contrast, average 
households in the Ohio Valley and Midatlantic regions fare equally under the LDC approach 
under case 2 assumptions and the auction-and-dividend approach.  
The explanation for these disparities hinges in large part on the way that allowances are 
apportioned to the states and their LDCs. There are three main criteria by which allowances 
could be distributed: consumption, emissions, and population. Because each one would affect 
states differently, the allocation system can dramatically shape regional distributions. All cases in 
this paper use a 50/50 split between consumption and emissions as stipulated in H.R. 2454. 
Regions such as the Ohio Valley and the Midatlantic have among the highest emissions intensity 
of electricity generation (see Table 1), so placing 50 percent weight in the apportionment on 
emissions benefits these regions relative to others. Another factor affecting the distribution of 
effects is the portion of electricity consumption by each customer class. The Plains region has the 
nation’s lowest share of consumption by residential customers compared to industrial and 
commercial classes; consequently relatively fewer of the benefits to residential-class customers 
under the LDC allocation accrue in this region. 
VI. Limitations of Analysis on only 30 Percent of Allowance Value  
An important consideration is how the remaining revenue not directed to LDCs is 
allocated — e.g. the remaining 70 percent less the 14 percent to government. How one accounts 
for this portion of the allowance value affects the calculation of the burden on households. The 
reason is that its value changes under the different cases we evaluate. For example, allocating 
revenue to LDCs is likely to lower electricity prices, which leads to expanded electricity 
consumption. Greater electricity consumption leads to an increase in allowance prices.  This 
consequently increases the total monetary value of the revenue not directed to LDCs. Thus, 
under an allocation to LDCs, the available potential rebate grows with the allowance price and 
can offset some of the increased burden felt by households. By focusing only on the 30 percent 
of allowance value, we ignore this impact. 
The increased value of the revenue not directed to LDCs, however, does not totally offset 
the extra burden on households from the increase in the allowance price.  The difference is the 
efficiency loss that results from other sectors having to make more expensive abatement 
decisions due to the expansion of consumption of electricity and greater emissions in the 
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The additional funds resulting from the increase in the allowance price were not 
explicitly rebated in our analysis in order to isolate the impacts of the LDC allocation, and not to 
confound those impacts with the distribution of the additional revenue.  However, our $157 per 
household estimate of the extra burden on households should be considered an upper bound on 
the true burden. Likewise, $36/household is the lower bound, assuming all of the additional 
revenue goes back to households. Without any specific direct rebate provisions, the distributional 
and regional impacts of this money remain uncertain as well.  
VII. A Case Study in Current Policy: LDC Allocation in the Waxman–Markey 
Proposal (H.R. 2454) and Potential Incremental Reform 
Thus far we have analyzed the impacts of the 30 percent of allowances that would go to 
electricity LDCs under H.R. 2454 without accounting for the remainder of the allowance value. 
In this section, we place this special treatment for the electricity sector in a broader context. In 
the bill, over the first couple of decades of the program, 56 percent of emissions allowances 
would be directed back to consumers and businesses in a way that is intended to rectify disparate 
impacts among income groups and regions. This allocation is directed to electricity LDCs (30 
percent), natural gas LDCs (9 percent), home heating-oil providers (2 percent), and direct 
compensation to low-income families (15 percent). Although we now account for 56 percent of 
the allowance value, we do not account for the remaining 44 percent.  
We characterize all of these provisions under the assumption in case 1 above, that is, that 
the allocation to LDCs is reflected in a reduction in the variable costs for all customer classes. In 
fact, the proposed legislation indicates that the allowance value may be directed to reduce the 
fixed part of the bill “to the maximum extent practicable,” but it also indicates that 
notwithstanding this direction, for industrial-class customers the value may be applied to the 
variable part of the bill.
14 We assume broadly that residential-class customers would not be able 
to distinguish between changes in the price and the bill, and would behave in either case as 
though electricity is cheaper due to the LDC allocation. For commercial-class customers, the 
implementation of a reduction in the fixed part of the bill is problematic because it introduces 
                                                 
14 The language says with respect to directing the allowance value to the fixed portion of the bill that "if compliance 
with the requirements of this title results (or would otherwise result) in an increase in electricity costs for industrial 
retail ratepayers of any given electricity local distribution company..., such electricity local distribution company—
...may do so based on the quantity of electricity delivered to individual industrial retail ratepayers." Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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moral hazard in the form of incentives to split accounts and open new accounts. Consequently, 
we represent the allocation to LDCs as a reduction in the variable portion of the bill as the most 
likely outcome under the proposed legislation. 
In this analysis we compare the results from the Waxman–Markey approach to an 
alternative incremental reform of the allocation of the 56 percent that limits allocation to LDCs 
on behalf of only residential consumers of electricity and natural gas. In the reform proposal, the 
allowance value that was scheduled to go to LDCs on behalf of commercial and industrial 
electricity and natural gas consumers, as well as the portion scheduled to go to home heating 
providers and low-income households, would instead be given directly to households in the form 
of a taxable per capita dividend. This incremental reform thus preserves some aspects of the 
LDC approach but reduces the allocation to LDCs and removes the other special provisions in 
favor of cap and dividend. This incremental reform thus allocates 15 percent of the allowance 
value to residential electricity and natural gas customers, consistent with H.R. 2454, and the 
remaining 41 percent as a per capita dividend.  
Impacts on Costs and Incidence across Income Groups  
The difference in the net loss in consumer surplus between the Waxman–Markey 
allocation and the reform proposal is reported in Table 4. On a national-average basis, the cost 
per household declines by $78 in the reform proposal due to the efficiency gain associated with 
limiting the allocation to LDCs. The allowance price falls from a value of $27.39 when 
accounting for 56 percent of the allowance value under Waxman–Markey to a value of $23.01 
under the reform proposal.  




Across income groups the reform proposal raises the costs for the bottom three income 
groups and most significantly for the top income group, while it reduces the costs even more 
significantly for the middle six income groups. While the first income decile is $80 worse off 
under the reform proposal than with H.R. 2454, they still receive a net gain of $87 under the 
reform policy. The greatest benefit accrues to the seventh income decile, with an average income 
of $61,558. This group would see a reduction in costs of $255 compared to H.R. 2454. 
The advantages of the reform are well illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the impact on 
households organized by income deciles. The status quo allocation of the 56 percent of 
allowances in H.R. 2454 is displayed in the left panel. The darker blue reports the loss to 
households from introducing a price on CO2 before accounting for any of the allowance value. 
The lighter blue reveals the loss to households after accounting for the 56 percent that we model 
as a representation of the Waxman–Markey proposal. The lighter blue reveals an inverted U with 
respect to the distribution of costs across household income groups. The status quo allocation in 
Waxman–Markey would do a good job of protecting the bottom 20 percent of households and 
the top 10 percent. The dotted horizontal line represents the average loss that we estimate under 
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Figure 4. Comparison of the Distributional Burden under Alternative Proposals 
 
 
The right panel in Figure 4 displays the incremental reform, which would smooth out the 
burden across household income groups. Simultaneously, the reform proposal lowers the overall 
costs of the program, resulting in every income group performing “above average,” that is, with 
costs below average, when compared to the average loss as a share of income (shown in the left-
hand panel). Figure 4 also indicates that the reform proposal is somewhat less progressive with 
respect to the impact on the bottom three income deciles, but the bottom decile remains a net 
winner under the policy and the second decile nearly breaks even. On net, the proposal appears 
to do well in protecting low-income households and provides a potent correction to the inverted 
U that appears under the Waxman–Markey approach, thereby removing the appearance that 
climate policy imposes a disproportionate tax on the middle class. 
Regional Impacts  
Free allocation to LDCs may have a justification in reducing regional disparities. 
However, the reform proposal that would limit LDC allocation to residential customers only does 
at least as well in this regard. Table 5 indicates that the average household in all regions is better 
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generation are among those that benefit the most from the reform. In particular, while costs fall 
by $78 on average for the nation, they fall by $91 in the Ohio Valley. Among other relatively 
emissions-intensive regions, costs fall by $68 in the Plains, less than the national average, and by 
$85 in the Mountain region, greater than average. In all of the regions household costs are 
reduced. On net the reform proposal appears to be sufficient to level the playing field across 
geographic regions as well as to protect low-income households, while reducing the overall costs 
of the program.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The introduction of a price on CO2 will have important effects on the economy, and 
especially important effects on the electricity sector. This paper examines alternative approaches 
to the distribution of allowance value to the sector, including free allocation to consumers 
through LDCs and direct per capita dividends. Consideration of allocation to LDCs has emerged 
as an important possibility in just the last three years as the United States has struggled to 
identify a political compromise that would enable a majority opinion to support climate policy. 
Allocation to LDCs may contribute to that outcome, but because it represents special treatment 
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Furthermore, there is uncertainty about how an allocation to LDCs might actually be 
implemented.  
We present the results from a pairing of models. One is built on CES data and provides 
an understanding of how the introduction of a price on CO2 will affect households in different 
regions and income groups. We pair that with a detailed model of the electricity sector, and use 
this suite of models to analyze the effects of allocation to LDCs.  
Compared to an auction with revenues returned on a per capita basis, we find that 
allocating 30 percent of the allowance value to LDCs raises the allowance price by as much as 
29 percent; however, the actual outcome will depend importantly on what is done with the 
remaining 70 percent of the allowance value. We directly compare two formulations of the way 
that allocations to LDCs may benefit households. In one case, the allowance value is used by 
LDCs to directly reduce electricity prices, and we find this would raise the average consumer 
surplus loss per household by $157 over a case with an auction coupled with a per capita 
dividend. In the other case the allowance value is directed toward reducing the fixed portion of 
electricity bills for industrial- and commercial-class customers, but is used to reduce the 
electricity price for residential-class customers. We find this would have less of an effect on the 
overall allowance price, raising it by just $66 over the auction-and-dividend case, suggesting the 
efficiency cost of this outcome would be less. However, because the reduction in the fixed part 
of electricity bills would work to the benefit of shareholders of the firms that constitute the 
LDC’s industrial- and commercial-class customers, it has a regressive effect on the distribution 
of costs over the population, thereby undermining the objective of the allocation to LDCs. 
In the last section we characterize a large part of the allocation scheme in the Waxman–
Markey proposal, describing 56 percent of the allocation formula, including provisions that are 
specifically aimed at correcting income group and regional disparities. This exercise provides a 
useful insight to the cost of achieving distributional goals from the standpoint of raising the 
overall cost of the program, but even more importantly it indicates that the same goals can be 
substantively achieved at much less cost. The proposed reform we model would redirect 44 
percent of the allowance value away from its narrowly defined constituents and direct it toward 
per capita dividends, leaving 15 percent to remain as allocation to electricity and natural gas 
LDCs that is targeted to residential-class customers only.  
This incremental reform results in savings of $78 per year for the average American 
household compared to the allocation scheme in H.R. 2454. Further, it would protect households 
in the bottom quintile of the income distribution in a manner similar to H.R. 2454. The middle Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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class, which bears a large portion of the burden under H.R. 2454, would receive substantial relief 
with the alternate approach. The reform also improves upon H.R. 2454 in addressing regional 
disparities by further compensating residential electricity consumers in the Ohio Valley region 
while reducing households burdens overall. The average household in the Ohio Valley region 
experiences savings of $91 under the reform proposal compared to H.R. 2454, which is even 
greater than the benefit on average across the nation from this incremental reform.  
Another feature of this reform is that it better achieves administrative simplicity and 
consistency than H.R. 2454. It is unclear how LDC allocation on behalf of industrial and 
commercial customers will flow to them, or whether the benefits will accrue to shareholders or 
be reflected in lower prices of goods and services for households. The outcome depends heavily 
on regulatory decisions by state public utility commissions. The reform we model removes this 
uncertainty by directly rebating the money as a dividend. The simple approach of direct 
dividends also avoids the appearance of favoritism by distributing to households an equal share 
of the value of a new property right that is created under a cap-and-trade program.  
There are important limitations to our model that could lead results to be misinterpreted, 
and we have tried to guard against that. The model does not directly replicate H.R. 2454. In the 
analysis of a reform to the proposed legislation, we use a characterization of LDC allocation that 
passes value through to all customer classes in the variable charge. Especially important, this 
analysis also does not account for the remaining 44 percent of the allowance value in any 
manner. If that value is returned as a per capita dividend or otherwise works to directly reduce 
the costs of the program for households, then it also lessens the impact of allocation to LDCs on 
overall cost. If the value is directed to other purposes, however, such as free allocation to 
industry or expenditure on unrelated programs, then it raises the cost of the allocation to LDCs. 
Further, we model a limited role for CO2 offsets and hold that level constant across various 
scenarios when examining alternative approaches to allocation. Under H.R. 2454, expanded use 
of offsets early in the program shifts the costs associated with domestic abatement to later years. 
If the supply of offsets is elastic, then the use of offsets could expand in response to an increase 
in the allowance price, thereby offsetting part of that increase. 
In conclusion, the way that emissions allowances are distributed will have significant 
efficiency and distributional effects. The way these effects are felt or perceived could have great 
consequence for the popularity and evolution of climate policy as well as the performance of the 
economy. This research illustrates that the allocation to LDCs poses a familiar trade-off between 
efficiency and distributional goals. While distributional outcomes may be worth the price, we Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
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find in our analysis of a reform proposal that similar distributional outcomes may be achieved at 
much less cost by incrementally substituting toward per capita dividends. 
   Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
31 
References 
Åhman, M., D. Burtraw, J. Kruger, and L. Zetterberg. 2007. A Ten-Year Rule to Guide the 
Allocation of EU Emission Allowances. Energy Policy 35(3): 1718–1730. 
Åhman, M., and K. Holmgren. 2006. New Entrant Allocation in the Nordic Energy Sectors: 
Incentives and Options in the EU ETS. Climate Policy 6: 423–440. 
Binmore, K., and P. Klemperer. 2002. The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G 
Telecom Licenses. The Economic Journal 112: C74–C76. 
Bovenberg, A.L., and L.H. Goulder. 1996. Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of 
Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses. American Economic Review 86(4): 985–
1000. 
Boyce , J and M Riddle. 2009. Cap and Dividend: A State-by-State Analysis. Political Economy 
Research Institute University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Burtraw, D., R. Sweeney, and M. Walls. 2009. The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative 
Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auction. National Tax Journal (forthcoming). 
Burtraw, D., and K. Palmer. 2008. Compensation Rules for Climate Policy in the Electricity 
Sector. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 27(4): 819–47.  
Burtraw, D., J. Goeree, C. Holt, K. Palmer, and W. Shobe. 2007. Auction Design for Selling CO2 
Emission Allowances under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Report to the New 
York State Energy Research and Development Authority. Washington, DC: Resources 
for the Future. 
Burtraw, D., K. Palmer, A. Paul, and R. Bharvirkar. 2002. The Effect on Asset Values of the 
Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances. The Electricity Journal 15(5): 51–
62. 
Congressional Budget Office. 2009. The Estimated Costs to Households from the Cap-and-Trade 
Provisions of H.R. 2454. Washington, DC: CBO. 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090620/cbowaxmanmarkey.pdf 
(accessed August 10, 2009).  
Dinan, T., and D. Rogers. 2002. Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance Trading: How 
Government Decisions Determine Winners and Losers. National Tax Journal 55(2): 199–
221. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
32 
Energy Information Administration. 2009. Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454, 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. SR/OIAF/2009-05. Washington, 
DC: EIA. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/pdf/sroiaf(2009)05.pdf 
(accessed August 20, 2009). 
———.  2008. Energy Market and Economic Impacts of S. 2191, the Lieberman–Warner 
Climate Security Act of 2007. SR/OIAF/2008-01. Washington, DC: EIA. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/s2191/pdf/sroiaf(2008)01.pdf (accessed March 10, 
2009). 
Environmental Protection Agency. 2009. EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009 H.R. 2454 in the 111th Congress. Washington, DC: EPA. 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis.pdf (accessed 
August 5, 2009). 
Fullerton, Don. 2009. Introduction, in D. Fullerton, ed., The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental and Energy Policy, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishers. 
Hassett, K., A. Mathur, and G. Metcalf. 2009. The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime 
and Regional Analysis. Energy Journal 30(2): 155–77. 
Metcalf, G. 2009. Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Review 
of Environmental Economics and Policy 3(1): 63–83. 
Metcalf, G., J.F. Holak, H. Jacoby, S. Paltsev, and J. Reilly. 2008. Analysis of U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Tax Proposals. NBER Working paper No. 13980. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Paltsev, S., J. Reilly, H. Jacoby, A. Gurgel, G. Metcalf, A. Sokolov, and J. Holak. 2007. 
Assessment of U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals. Report No. 146. MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 
Parry, I.W.H. 2004. Are Emissions Permits Regressive? Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 47(2): 364–87. 
Parry, I.W.H., R.C. Williams III, and L.H. Goulder. 1999. When Can Carbon Abatement Policies 
Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 37(1): 51–84. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 
33 
Paul, A., D. Burtraw, and K. Palmer. 2009a. Compensation for Electricity Consumers under a 
U.S. CO2 Emissions Cap. In Reforming Rules and Regulations: Laws, Institutions and 
Enforcement, edited by Vivek Ghosal. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (forthcoming).  
Paul, A., D. Burtraw, and K. Palmer. 2009b. Haiku Documentation: RFF’s Electricity Market 
Model Version 2.0. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Pizer, W., J. Sanchirico, and M. Batz. 2009. Regional Patterns of U.S. Household Carbon 
Emissions. Climate Change. http://www.springerlink.com/content/vu78265352673m82/ 
(accessed September 25, 2009). 
Ruth, M., S. Gabriel, K. Palmer, A. Paul, Y. Chen, B. Hobbs, D. Irani, J. Michael, K. Ross, R. 
Conklin, and J. Miller. 2008. Economic and Energy Impacts from Participation in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A Case Study of the State of Maryland. Energy 
Policy 36: 2279–2289. 
 